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THE EFFECT OF CHOICE OF LAW ON FEDERAL
JURISDICTION UNDER ERISA: DEFINING THE
SCOPE OF THE ACT OR OMISSION
PREEMPTION EXCEPTION
INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA") is to protect the interests of employees in pen-
sion and welfare plans.2 Regulation of such plans by piecemeal state and
federal legislation had failed to ensure that employees received their
promised benefits.3 ERISA was designed to cure these deficiencies by
establishing minimum vesting and funding standards, defining fiduciary
duties, furnishing effective remedies for violations, and providing ready
access to the federal courts. 4 ERISA was intended to be a nationally
uniform scheme that would displace state regulation in the field.' Ac-
cordingly, Congress directed that ERISA "supercede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan ... "6 The preemptive effect of this provision, however, is limited:
"This section shall not apply with respect to any cause of action which
arose, or any act or omission which occurred, before January 1, 1975."1
This exception prevents the retroactive application of ERISA standards.8
The circumstances under which the exception applies, however, are far
from certain.
A claim is clearly actionable under ERISA when all of the acts giving
rise to it occurred after January 1, 1975. 9 Similarly, when all acts took
place prior to that date, pre-ERISA state law governs.'" Determining
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)).
2. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 23, 30 (1978).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982). For an overview of pre-ERISA regulation of
benefit plans, see Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in
Effective Federalism, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 427, 437-42 (1987); Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra
note 2, at 25-30.
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b), 1001(c) (1982).
5. See Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 71 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 202 (1989); S. Rep. No. 1090, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 3
Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,4655,4670
(1976); Note, The Fraud Exception to ERISA's Anti-Alienation Provision: A Permissible
Exercise of the Chancellor's Powers?, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 835, 849 & n.103 (1989); Note,
ERISA Preemption of State Law: The Meaning of "Relate To" in Section 514, 58 Wash.
U.L.Q. 143, 145 (1980).
6. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
7. See id. § 514(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1) (1982).
8. See Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 71; Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738
F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir. 1984); Freeman v. Jacques Orthopaedic & Joint Surgery Medi-
cal Group, Inc., 721 F.2d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 1983).
9. See Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 71 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 202 (1989).
10. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1500.
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the applicable law becomes troublesome, however, when acts relating to
the claim occur both before and after ERISA's effective date.11 The
choice of law then turns on determining which event is the relevant act
or omission.1 2
Several circuits consider the denial of benefits by plan trustees to be the
pertinent act or omission in a case, and will apply ERISA to any post-
ERISA denial, regardless of when other events relating to the claim took
place.13 Under this approach, federal law will apply in nearly every case,
since the denial usually occurs after 1975.14 According to this view, a
narrow reading of the "act or omission" clause comports with Congress'
intent that ERISA be phased in as quickly as possible.15
Other circuits apply the preemption exception found in section
514(b)(1) more liberally. 6 Under this view, ERISA standards are not
applied automatically to every post-1975 denial of benefits. A denial that
does not involve any exercise of discretion is not an independent act or
omission; it is merely an "inexorable consequence ' 17 of earlier conduct,
such as the adoption of a pension plan rule or practice. The governing
standards should therefore be provided by the state law in existence at
the time that the conduct occurred.' 8 The rationale for this position is
that it is unfair to apply ERISA standards retroactively to the past con-
duct of a plan trustee,' 9 particularly one who may have been acting in
accordance with the law as it then existed.
Most circuits have assumed that Congress did not intend to confer
federal jurisdiction over pension claims to which state law, rather than
11. See, eg., Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 891 (5th Cir. 1989) ("break in
seniority" took place in 1970, but denial of retirement benefits occurred in 1979);
Lamontagne v. United Wire, Metal & Mach. Pension Fund, 869 F.2d 153, 154-55 (2d
Cir.) (break in employment occurred in 1971, but denial of benefits occurred in 1978),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 72 (1989).
12. See generally Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 72 (attempt to define "act or omission");
Jameson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Pension Plan, 765 F.2d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 1985) (same);
Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 1984) (same);
Coward v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 686 F.2d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1982) (same).
13. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
14. See, eg., Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 71-72 (4th Cir.) (ac-
tion brought in 1987, after formal denial made in 1985), cer denied, 110 S. Ct. 202
(1989); Smith v. Retirement Fund Trust, 857 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1988) (action filed
soon after denial in 1986); Stevens v. Employer-Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 Pension
Fund, 711 F. Supp. 384, 385 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (review of 1988 denial requested in 1989).
15. See Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 72; Bacon v. Wong, 445 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (N.D.
Cal. 1978).
16. See infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
17. See Quinn v. Country Club Soda Co., 639 F.2d 838, 841 (1st Cir. 1981).
18. See, e-g., Lamontagne v. United Wire, Metal & Mach. Pension Fund, 869 F.2d
153, 155-56 (2d Cir.) (applying pre-ERISA state law to pension claim), cer denied, 110
S. Ct. 72 (1989); Baum v. Nolan, 853 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (2d Cir. 1988) (same); Menhorn
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1505 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Quinn, 639
F.2d at 841 (same).
19. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1500 n.3; Stevens v. Employer-Teamsters Joint Council
No. 84 Pension Fund, 711 F. Supp. 384, 387 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
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ERISA, is applicable.20 Under this approach, a claim based on a pre-
ERISA act or omission, and thus governed by state law, will be dis-
missed from federal court. A minority of circuits, however, do not con-
sider section 514(b)(1) to be a limitation on jurisdiction.21 These circuits
have found that the provision governs the choice of substantive law
only,' and as such, a federal court should not decline to hear a case
simply because state law is held to apply.
Part I of this Note presents the background of the jurisdictional provi-
sions of ERISA. Part II analyzes the two-prong test derived from sec-
tion 514(b)(1), that is used to determine the appropriate substantive law
to be applied, which centers on the definition of "act or omission." Part
III examines the relationship between choice of law and jurisdiction.
The Note concludes that choice of law should be decided on a case-by-
case basis, with all the relevant facts of a claim, not merely the date of the
benefits denial, taken into account. Federal courts should recognize the
preemption provision as an implicit restraint on jurisdiction, and decline
to hear cases to which state law applies.
I. ERISA's JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS
Section 50223 is the only provision in ERISA that deals expressly with
the question of federal jurisdiction. The provision gives federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over most ERISA actions.24Federal and state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, however, over civil actions brought
by participants or beneficiaries to recover benefits, or to enforce and clar-
ify rights under plan terms.'5 This increases the number of forums avail-
able to a claimant seeking review of a denial of benefits, and relieves the
burden on federal courts caused by a large number of ERISA claims.26
ERISA's act or omission preemption exception does not expressly
limit section 502's grant of federal jurisdiction.27 Nevertheless, most cir-
cuits have found that Congress did not intend for federal courts to hear
20. See Lamontagne, 869 F.2d at 156; Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1505; Coward v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., 686 F.2d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1982); Quinn, 639 F.2d at 840-41;
Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan, 637 F.2d 357, 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836
(1981).
21. See Jameson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Pension Plan, 765 F.2d 49, 51-52 (3d Cir.
1985); Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1351-52 (8th Cir. 1980).
22. See Jameson, 765 F.2d at 51; Landro, 625 F.2d at 1352.
23. See ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982).
24. Section 502(e)(1) of ERISA states that "[e]xcept for actions under subsection(a)(1)(B) of this section, the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive juris-
diction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary [of Labor] or by a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1982).
25. ERISA § 502(a) states: "A civil action may be brought-() by a participant or
beneflciary-... (B) to recover benefits due him under the terms of his plan, to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
26. See Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1500 n.2 (9th Cir.
1984).
27. See Lee v. Garrett Corp. Retirement Plan, 803 F.2d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1986);
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pension cases based on pre-ERISA state law. 28 Because federal courts
must first decide what law should apply in order to determine whether
federal jurisdiction exists, it is necessary to examine the scope of this
preemption exception in greater detail.
II. SECTION 514's Two-PRONG TEST
Section 514(a) of ERISA provides a broad preemption provision that
was intended to eliminate the threat of conflicting benefit plan regulation
by the states.29 An exception is found in section 514(b)(1), however,
which provides a two-prong test to determine whether pre-ERISA state
law should apply in a given case.30 Under the test, two dates must be
taken into account: when the cause of action arose, and when the acts or
omissions occurred.31 ERISA applies if both of these events took place
after January 1, 1975.2 Controversy exists, however, as to what this test,
particularly the act or omission prong, specifically requires. How this
test is construed affects the choice of law, and may ultimately determine
whether the claimant will have access to a federal forum.3"
Jameson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Pension Plan, 765 F.2d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 1985);
Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1503.
28. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
29. See 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974) (remarks of Congressman Dent).
Section 514 has been called "one of the most sweeping preemption clauses ever in-
cluded in any federal legislation." See Gregory, supra note 3, at 431-32. The legislative
history clearly indicates that this is indeed the intended interpretation. Senator Williams,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, stated in reference to
section 514: "It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill,
the substantive and enforcement provisions... are intended to preempt the field for
Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and
local regulation of employee benefit plans." 120 Cong. Rec. 29,933 (1974).
Senator Javits stated that "the emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal
interest and the interests of uniformity with respect to interstate plans required-but for
certain exceptions-the displacement of State action in the field of private employee bene-
fit programs." Id. at 29,942.
The Supreme Court has called the preemption provision "deliberately expansive, and
designed to 'establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern."' See
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)); see also Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
U.S. 497, 499 n.l (1978) (ERISA expressly preempts all state laws regulating benefit
plans). The logical corollary is that any exception to this broad provision should be con-
strued narrowly. See Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 894 n.7 (5th Cir. 1989).
30. See Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 71-72 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 202 (1989); Smith v. Retirement Trust Fund, 857 F.2d 587, 589-90 (9th
Cir. 1988); Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1500 n.3 (9th Cir.
1984); Stevens v. Employer-Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 Pension Fund, 711 F. Supp.
384, 386-87 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
31. See ERISA § 514(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1) (1982).
32. See Rodiguez, 872 F.2d at 72; Smith, 857 F.2d at 589-90; Menhorn, 738 F.2d at
1500 n.3; Stevens, 711 F. Supp. at 386-87.
33. See Baum v. Nolan, 853 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1313 (1989); Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1505. But see Jameson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Pension Plan, 765 F.2d 49, 51-52 (3d Cir. 1985); Landro v. Glendenning Motorways,
Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1352 (8th Cir. 1980).
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A. Time When Cause of Action Accrues
It is accepted that a cause of action for wrongful denial of benefits does
not arise until a claim is made and formally denied.34 The reason for this
is two-fold: it ensures fairness to plan participants, and promotes judicial
economy." A plan participant is unlikely to be aware that his benefits
are at risk until he receives a formal denial. To require that he be contin-
ually alert for any conduct by plan trustees that might give rise to a claim
would be "burdensome and unfair."36 Establishing the time of accrual as
the date of denial therefore "protect[s] unwary litigants against the inad-
vertent loss of benefits through the running of the statute of
limitations. 37
This view also serves to conserve judicial resources. A participant or
beneficiary is less likely to burden the courts with multiple and prema-
ture actions if freed from the fear that a statute of limitations will deprive
him of his cause of action.3 8
If this prong were the only requirement set forth in section 514, ER-
ISA standards would apply in nearly every case. The denial of benefits is
typically the last of a series of events leading to a claim, and usually
occurs long after ERISA's effective date.39 In order for ERISA stan-
dards to apply, however, the relevant "act or omission" must occur after
January 1, 1975.
B. Timing of Acts or Omissions
Section 514(b)(1)'s second prong states that ERISA does not apply to
any act or omission that occurred before January 1, 1975.4 The Act
does not specify, however, at what point the conduct of plan trustees
becomes the act or omission at issue: when they adopt a plan provision,
or alternatively, when they deny a claim for benefits pursuant to that
34. See Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 72 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 202 (1989); Tanzillo v. Local Union 617, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 769 F.2d
140, 144 (3d Cir. 1985); Quinn v. Country Club Soda Co., 639 F.2d 838, 840 (1st Cir.
1981); Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan, 637 F.2d 357, 360-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
836 (1981); Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1978); Stevens v. Em-
ployer-Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 Pension Fund, 711 F. Supp. 384, 387 (S.D. Ohio
1989).
35. See Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 72-73; Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738
F.2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir. 1984); Paris, 637 F.2d at 361.
36. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1501; see also Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 72 (such a rule
would be a great burden on plan participants); Stevens, 711 F. Supp. at 386-87 (same).
37. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1500 n.3.
38. See Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 72 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 202 (1989); Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1501; Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan, 637 F.2d
357, 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).
39. See, eg., Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 70-71 (nearly twenty years elapsed between
events leading to claim and eventual denial); Smith v. Retirement Fund Trust, 857 F.2d
587, 588-89 (9th Cir. 1988) (denial not made until 1986, but acts leading to refusal of
benefits occurred as far back as 1968).
40. See ERISA § 514(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1) (1982).
1001
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policy. Nor does the legislative history reveal the term's intended mean-
ing.4 1 The burden of interpreting the phrase has thus fallen on the
courts, which have had to balance several competing interests in accom-
plishing the task.
1. Broader Reading of Act or Omission Clause
The First, Second, and Ninth Circuits' broader definition of the act or
omission clause reflects a desire to protect defendant trustees.42 Their
concern is that trustees will be treated unfairly if their conduct is judged
by standards different from those that existed when they acted 3 Thus,
in making a choice of law determination, a court should seek to prevent
the retroactive application of remedial principles.44 This is best achieved
by looking not only to the date of the claim denial, but also to the date of
the act or omission underlying the denial 45 ERISA standards should
not be applied solely on the basis of a perfunctory post-ERISA denial.
46
41. See Woodfork v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 970 (5th Cir.
1981); Stevens v. Employer-Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 Pension Fund, 711 F. Supp.
384, 386 (S.D. Ohio 1989); Bacon v. Wong, 445 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (N.D. Ca. 1978);
Note, Defining the Contours of ERISA Preemption of State Insurance Regulation: Mak-
ing Employee Benefit Plan Regulation an Exclusively Federal Concern, 42 Vand. L. Rev.
607, 613-14 (1989).
42. See Lamontagne v. Pension Fund of United Wire, Metal & Mach. Pension Fund,
869 F.2d 153, 156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 72 (1989); Menhorn v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1500 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984); Quinn v. Country Club Soda Co.,
639 F.2d 838, 841 (1st Cir. 1981).
43. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1500; Quinn, 639 F.2d at 841; Bacon, 445 F. Supp. at
1192.
44. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1500 n.3; see also Bacon, 445 F. Supp. at 1192 (act or
omission clause was apparently intended to permit the application of state law "in cases
where that result most fairly accommodates the interests of all affected parties.").
45. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1500-01 & n.3; Quinn, 639 F.2d at 840-41.
46. See Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1501-02 (9th Cir.
1984); Quinn v. Country Club Soda Co., 639 F.2d 838, 841 (1st Cir. 1981).
In Quinn, plaintiff made a demand for benefits under his company's employee benefit
plan, which was denied in 1976. He had been told that he could not take part in the plan
at its inception in 1960, and was given increased compensation in lieu of participation.
According to the First Circuit-
The clear practical import of the act or omission clause is to prevent past con-
duct of pension plan fiduciaries and contributors from being judged retroac-
tively under the standards established by ERISA simply because the conduct
generates consequences subsequent to the ERISA effective date that give rise to
what is, technically, an independent 'cause of action.'
Quinn, 639 F.2d at 841.
In denying his claim, the trustees were found to have been "simply following through
on a position consistently taken and communicated to plaintiff from the time the Plan
was established." Id
The Second Circuit arrived at the same result in Lamontagne v. Pension Plan of the
United Wire, Metal & Machine Pension Fund, 869 F.2d 153 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 72 (1989). The "act central to" the case was determined to be the trustees' pre-
ERISA adoption of the break-in-service policy, which had been their only exercise of
discretion. The denial of Lamontagne's claim was merely the inevitable result of this
prior act. See id. at 156-57.
The Lamontagne court noted in dicta that ERISA standards may have been applicable
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There are situations, however, in which the post-ERISA denial of ben-
efits may serve as the act or omission, as well as the accrual of the cause
of action.4 7 The key question is whether the denial was discretionary in
nature.48 If it is necessary to interpret the plan's provisions or use discre-
tion in applying them to a particular employee's claim, the denial can be
"both the event triggering accrual of a cause of action and the substantial
act resulting in denial of benefits."49 For example, the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied ERISA to a post-1975 denial which it found to be the result of a
significant act of discretion."0
It is important to note that even circuits that have adopted the broader
view will not apply state law merely because any act related to a claim
occurred before 1975.51 Only the "critical acts' 5 2 or those facts funda-
mental to53 the claim are considered in determining the proper choice of
law.
Similarly, ERISA will not be applied to what is essentially a state law
claim simply because the pre-ERISA act or omission at issue is labeled a
"continuous breach."5 Several claimants have argued unsuccessfully55
to Lamontagne's claim if he had requested an exemption from the break-in-service rule
when he applied for benefits in 1978. The trustees would then have had to exercise dis-
cretion in determining whether to recognize his absence as a grace period. See id. Such a
post-ERISA decision may have been sufficient to satisfy both prongs of the preemption
exception.
47. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1502-03.
48. See id.
49. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
50. In Smith v. Retirement Fund Trust, 857 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth
Circuit held that the act or omission relevant to the claim was the trustees' decision to
deny Smith credit for his earlier years of service in 1986, when they denied his applica-
tion. Id. at 589-90. This denial "was not based on an unambiguous plan provision
adopted before the effective date of ERISA, but rather on what the trustees thought to be
the current law governing participation in a... trust." See id. at 590. The only pre-
ERISA conduct, the failure to record pension credits for the years in question, was not an
affirmative denial of pension credits. See id. ERISA standards were therefore applied to
Smith's case.
51. One court remarked that "Congress could not have meant that if any act or omis-
sion relevant to the cause of action occurred prior to January 1, 1975, state law would
control." Coward v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 686 F.2d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1982) (quot-
ing Winer v. Edison Bros. Stores Pension Plan, 593 F.2d 307, 313 (8th Cir. 1979) (em-
phasis in original)), eert denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983); see also Woodfork v. Marine
Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1981) (the "contention that
causes of action are excepted from preemption whenever they involve any pre-1975 acts
or omissions could deny many individuals the right to sue in federal court" (emphasis
added)).
52. See Coward, 686 F.2d at 1233. The Coward court found the "voluntary, intelligi-
ble and meaningful" pre-ERISA waiver of benefits to be the critical act. See id. It there-
fore refused to assert jurisdiction over such a claim. See id. at 1234.
53. Freeman v. Jacques Orthopaedic & Joint Implant Surgery Medical Group, Inc.,
721 F.2d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 1983). A waiver of benefits was found to be the material fact
ultimately giving rise to Freeman's claim. Since it occurred in 1971, the court deter-
mined that federal subject matter jurisdiction did not exist. See id.
54. The concept of a continuous breach is illustrated in Baum v. Nolan, 853 F.2d
1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1313 (1988). The participants of a pension fund
brought suit against its trustees for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. They contended
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that what were originally pre-ERISA acts or omissions were continuous
in nature, and thus fell within the ambit of ERISA standards.56
2. Narrow Interpretation of Act or Omission
The Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits interpret the act or omission
clause narrowly.5 7 Under their restrictive reading of the provision, a
post-ERISA denial constitutes the act or omission needed to bring a case
under federal law; earlier events are simply disregarded." Their ration-
ale is that a denial is the relevant act or omission because it inevitably
involves some form of discretion or interpretation of plan terms.5 9 More-
that the trustees agreed to merge their fund with another without properly inquiring into
the second fund's financial soundness. Although the merger agreement was entered into
in 1973, the participants claimed that this initial breach was continuous in that it tainted
all subsequent payments of benefits made pursuant to the agreement. See id. at 1075.
The court refused to apply ERISA on the basis of this "continuous violation" theory,
since to do so "would read... section [514(b)(1)] out of the statute." Id. (quoting Martin
v. Banker's Trust, 565 F.2d 1276, 1278-79 (4th Cir. 1977)). Every breach or denial could
be construed as continuous in nature, and as such, ERISA would always apply. See
Baum, 853 F.2d at 1075.
55. See Baum, 853 F.2d at 1075; Coward v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 686 F.2d 1230,
1234 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983); United Indep. Flight Officers,
Inc. v. United Air Lines, 572 F. Supp. 1494, 1502 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
56. See Baum, 853 F.2d at 1075; Coward, 686 I .2d at 1234; United, 572 F. Supp. at
1502.
57. See Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 72 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 202 (1989); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 894 (5th Cir. 1989);
Tanzillo v. Local Union 617, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 769 F.2d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 1985).
In Rodriguez, plaintiff became a member of the Maritime Engineer Beneficial Associa-
tion (MEBA) in 1944. He retired from his job in 1965, and started receiving a monthly
pension from MEBA's trust. In 1967, he started working again for a company that also
joined a collective bargaining agreement with MEBA. He was reinstated to the union,
and was permitted to continue receiving his monthly pension. See id. at 71.
The trust regulations were amended in 1968 to allow employees receiving pensions an
option: they could suspend their prior pensions and accrue additional benefits or con-
tinue to receive their monthly pension checks without receiving further credit. Rodriguez
was never informed of the new rule. He wrote to a plan administrator in 1972 for an
update of his status with the trust and learned of the option, but was told that he could no
longer choose to accrue credits. He continued to work for 12 more years without chal-
lenging the issue. Upon retiring in 1986, Rodriguez was denied a lump-sum payment of
benefits because he had not exercised the option of suspending his pension and accruing
further credits. See id.
The Fourth Circuit applied ERISA to plaintiff's claim because it determined that both
the cause of action and the relevant act or omission took place simultaneously in 1986,
when his request for benefits was denied. See id. at 72. It found that "[w]hile a claim
determination may require the plan's trustees to consider pre-ERISA acts, the act of
denying a pension post-ERISA will invariably involve a 'contemporaneous construction
of the plan's provisions.. . to which ERISA's fiduciary standards apply."' Id. (quoting
Tanzillo, 769 F.2d at 144).
58. See Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 72; Degan, 869 F.2d at 895.
59. See Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 72; Tanzillo, 769 F.2d at 144.
In Tanzillo, the Third Circuit decided to "part company with the Ninth Circuit... in
its failure to recognize a pension denial as the 'act or omission' which is subject to ER-
ISA." Tanzillo, 769 F.2d at 144. The court declined to accept the finding "that the
metaphysical operation of the 1967 break-in-service clause is the relevant 'act or omis-
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over, such a reading of the statute is consistent with Congress' goals of
implementing ERISA as rapidly as possible ° and providing "ready ac-
cess to the Federal courts."6 The date on which the plan trustees deny a
plaintiff's application for benefits should therefore determine the choice
of law.62 Under this approach, ERISA standards would apply to a
greater number of claims. 3
C. Broader View Comports with Congressional Intent and Serves
Interests of All Parties
The Fourth Circuit maintains that a narrow reading of the act or omis-
sion clause serves to provide "ready access to the Federal courts," as
Congress intended." This phrase, however, is taken out of context.
Congress seems to have intended to provide a federal forum for only
those claims that would be governed by the Act.6" When read in its en-
tirety, the passage quoted by the court suggests that access to the federal
courts was intended to help enforce the new standards created by ER-
ISA, and "not for all causes of action concerning employee benefit
plans.' 66
In addition, the Fourth Circuit claims that its view "fosters the con-
gressional grant 'to extend the protections ofERISA... as soon as prac-
ticable,' ,67 and comports with the intention that the preemption
exception be narrowly construed. Rapid implementation and expansive
preemption are certainly goals of ERISA 8 Section 514(b)(1), however,
sion' for the purposes of the ERISA fiduciary standards." Id. (footnote omitted). It
found instead that the "contemporaneous construction of the plan's provisions," which
occurred when the trustees decided to deny Tanzillo the credits in 1981, was the act or
omission at issue. ERISA was therefore applied to Tanzillo's claim. See id
60. See Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 72; Bacon v. Wong, 445 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (N.D.
Cal. 1978).
61. Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 72 (4th Cir.) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(b) (1982)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 202 (1989).
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) states in pertinent part:
It is hearby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate com-
merce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their bene-
ficiares... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation
for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate reme-
dies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
62. See Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 72; Tanzillo, 769 F.2d at 144.
63. See Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 72.
64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982); Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738
F.2d 1496, 1503-04 (9th Cir. 1984).
66. Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1503-04 (footnote omitted).
67. Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 72 (4th Cir.) (quoting Winer v.
Edison Bros. Stores Pension Plan, 593 F.2d 307, 313 (8th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 202 (1989).
68. See, e-g., Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 72 (rapid implementation of ERISA and broad
preemption were intended by Congress); Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 2, at 34 (ER-
ISA displaced large body of state law); Gregory, supra note 3, at 457 ("preemption clause
was designed to have a very broad, although not absolute, effect"); Note, supra note 41, at
613-14 (legislative history indicates that preemption was intended to be expansive).
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is an exception to the general provisions of the Act; its purpose is to place
certain cases beyond ERISA's reach. The narrow reading of the preemp-
tion provisions recommended by the Fourth Circuit undermines this in-
tent by including virtually every case within ERISA's scopeA9
A statute should not be construed so as to render any provision "su-
perfluous or insignificant."7 One commentator has suggested that sec-
tion 514(b)(1)'s two prongs are irreconcilable. 7 Therefore, when a court
focuses on the act or omission prong, it does so at the expense of the
cause of action prong.72
State law should not apply to a case merely because a minor act related
to the claim occurred by chance before ERISA's effective date.73 If the
act or omission clause were read to apply state law whenever any rele-
vant conduct occurred pre-ERISA, the cause of action prong would be-
come irrelevant. 74 The time of the denial would have no bearing in such
a case; state law would always control.7 No decision has suggested that
the act or omission clause be read so broadly.
Likewise, a court should not overlook the act or omission prong by
limiting its inquiry exclusively to the date of the claim denial. ERISA
standards should not govern a claim based essentially on pre-ERISA
conduct simply because the formal denial was made after 1975.76 If the
term act or omission were to be interpreted as narrowly as is suggested
by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, only the denial date would be of conse-
quence; the date of the act or omission at the heart of a case would be-
come irrelevant.77 The preemption exception as a whole would become
meaningless under this view, because the time of denial, which is usually
quite recent,7" would always determine the choice of law.
The broader approach taken by the Ninth Circuit recognizes and ap-
69. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
70. See Woodfork v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 970-71 (5th Cir.
1981) (quoting Zeigler Coal Co. v. Kleppe, 536 F.2d 398, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
71. See Note, Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.: The Ninth Circuit's Resolu-
tion of the Jurisdictional Conflicts Contained in the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 21 Willamette L. Rev. 921, 932-34 (1985).
72. See id. at 932-933.
73. See Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 894 (5th Cir. 1989); Bacon v. Wong,
445 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (N.D. Ca. 1978).
74. See, e.g., Degan, 869 F.2d at 894 ("[E]xcepting from ERISA preemption any suit
in which some of the facts occurred prior to 1975, would render the first clause of section
[514](b)(1) superfluous."); Bacon, 445 F. Supp. at 1192 ("[I]f the occurrence before Janu-
ary 1, 1975, of any act or omission relevant to a cause of action, even if it constituted
[only one] element of a multi-element cause of action, made state law controlling, the
clause of§ 514(b)(1) concerning the accrual of a cause of action would be superfluous.").
75. See Degan, 869 F.2d at 894; Bacon, 445 F. Supp. at 1192; Note, supra note 71, at
933-34.
76. See Lamontagne v. Pension Plan of the United Wire, Metal & Mach. Pension
Fund, 869 F.2d 153, 156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 72 (1989); Quinn v. Country
Club Soda Co., 639 F.2d 838, 841 (1st Cir. 1981).
77. See Note, supra note 71, at 933-34.
78. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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plies both prongs by taking all the facts into consideration: the date of
the formal denial, as well as the dates of any relevant acts or omissions.79
This broader reading strikes a fair balance between acknowledging the
interests of both plan participants and trustees."0 By considering the is-
sue on a case-by-case basis, the true time of the relevant decision-making
is determined as accurately as possible."' This ensures that the law ap-
plied to a case is that which a trustee could have relied upon when he
acted, and not standards that he could not have reasonably anticipated."1
The broader view also considers the interests of plaintiff participants.8 3
If federal jurisdiction is foreclosed because state law is held to apply, a
claimant still may pursue her case, which is rooted in state law, 4 in state
court 8 5
III. SECTION 514's EFFECT ON JURISDICTION
Having established that pre-ERISA state law should govern a claim, a
federal court must determine whether it has the power to decide the
case86 or whether it should be dismissed for lack of subject matter juris-
diction. 7 Many circuits choose to dismiss claims based on pre-ERISA
state law. 8  A minority of federal decisions, however, have concluded
that they are empowered to hear such cases and to apply the appropriate
79. See Smith v. Retirement Fund Trust, 857 F.2d 587, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1988);
Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1500-01 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1984).
80. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1500 n.3.
81. See id.
82. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
83. See Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1501 n.4 (9th Cir.
1984).
84. As in federal court, the statute of limitations is not likely to bar a plaintiff's state
pension claim. See Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 745, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1983). In
most instances, the time limitation will not begin running until the plaintiff learns or
should have learned she had a claim. See id. This is usually the date a request for bene-
fits is formally denied. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
85. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1501 n.4; Quinn v. Country Club Soda Co., 639 F.2d
838, 841 n.3 (Ist Cir. 1981).
86. See Jameson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Pension Plan, 765 F.2d 49, 52 (3d Cir.
1985); Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1503.
87. The importance of this issue was noted in United States v. Hill, 694 F.2d 258, 260
(D.C. Cir. 1982):
It is a principle of first importance that the federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction .... They are empowered to hear only those cases that (1) are
within the judicial power..., and (2) that have been entrusted to them by a
jurisdictional grant by Congress.... The presumption is that a federal court
lacks jurisdiction in a particular case until it has been demonstrated that juris-
diction over the subject matter exists.
Id. (quoting 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3522
(1975) (footnotes omitted)).
88. See Lee v. Garrett Corp. Retirement Plan, 803 F.2d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1986);
Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1505 (9th Cir. 1984); Wood-
fork v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 971-92 (5th Cir. 1981); Quinn v.
Country Club Soda Co., 639 F.2d 838, 841-42 (1st Cir. 1981).
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state law.8 9
In Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,' the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that state law governed plaintiff's claim. It therefore dismissed
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 91 stating that "without
any provision of federal law to interpret or enforce, there is no interest in
providing a federal forum." 92 Menhorn further noted that such cases are
an unnecessary burden on the federal judiciary.93
The most serious concern over granting a federal forum for such
claims, however, is the "lurking constitutional difficulty"94 it would pres-
ent under Article III of the Constitution. Absent diversity of citizenship,
federal jurisdiction extends only to cases and controversies "arising
under" federal law.95 Most courts do not consider a claim brought under
ERISA, but to which state law applies, as arising under federal law.96 It
is therefore doubtful whether Congress intended to grant the federal judi-
ciary jurisdiction to apply state law.9 7 Many courts, apparently assum-
ing that Congress could not have intended such a grant, simply dismiss
these cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without offering a
rationale.98
89. See Jameson, 765 F.2d at 51-52; Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625
F.2d 1344, 1352 (8th Cir. 1980).
90. 738 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1984).
91. See id. at 1503. The court asked:
Did Congress intend that, even in cases where ERISA by its own terms does not
supplant otherwise applicable state law, a federal forum should be open to en-
force that state law? The statement of the issue suggests its resolution.
Although § [514] speaks only in terms of preemption, we think the conclusion
inevitable that it also indicates legislative intent regarding the scope of the juris-
diction conferred under § [502(e)].
Id.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Jameson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Pension Plan, 765 F.2d 49, 51 (3d Cir. 1985).
95. Article III states: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ... " U.S. Const.,
art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
96. See, e.g., Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1505 (9th Cir.
1984) (suggesting that pension claim based on pre ERISA act or omission does not arise
under federal law); Woodfork v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 971
(5th Cir. 1981) ("A state claim not preempted by ERISA obviously does not arise under
federal law and the federal forum is thus, absent diversity, closed to it.").
97. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 442 (1955); Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1505; Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan,
637 F.2d 357, 359 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).
98. See Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 72 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 202 (1989); Lamontagne v. United Wire, Metal & Mach. Pension Fund, 869
F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 72 (1989); Baum v. Nolan, 853 F.2d 1071,
1075 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1313 (1989); Freeman v. Jacques Orthopaedic
& Joint Implant Surgery Medical Group, Inc., 721 F.2d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 1983); Quinn
v. Country Club Soda Co., 639 F.2d 838, 841-42 (1st Cir. 1981); Stevens v. Employer-
Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 Pension Fund, 711 F. Supp. 384, 387-88 (S.D. Ohio
1989).
A court that decides it lacks subject matter jurisdiction may nonetheless find another
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A minority of circuits find that section 514 does not limit federal juris-
diction.99 These circuits maintain that this provision speaks to the issue
of preemption only, and "does no more than inform the court that ER-
ISA's substantive provisions are not to be used."' l" ° In addition, declin-
ing federal jurisdiction in these cases "would substantially weaken the
remedy of clarification provided by section [502](a)(1)(B)," which could
be provided by the federal courts 10°
The dissent in Menhorn advanced another reason for finding federal
jurisdiction to hear claims that straddle ERISA's effective date. A plain-
tiff who is denied a federal forum will seek redress from a state court
which may be required to apply ERISA standards to those acts in the
case that occurred after 1975. This is an ironic result, since it "commits
to the state courts the duty to apply federal law... [but] deniesfederal
courts the power to apply this same federal body of regulation.""0 2
The First, Second and Ninth Circuits correctly interpret the preemp-
tion provision as an implicit restraint on federal jurisdiction. Because a
basis upon which to hear the state law pension claim. Diversity of citizenship is one
possibility. See, ag., Woodfork v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 971
(5th Cir. 1981) (absent diversity, federal forum is closed to pre-ERISA claim); Stevens,
711 F. Supp. at 387 (a plaintiff "may have a cause of action based on pre-ERISA state
law over which this Court may have jurisdiction if diversity and amount in controversy
requirements [are] met"). Pendent jurisdiction may be another option if plaintiff has
raised a valid ERISA claim in addition to the claim governed by state law. See Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Greene, 570 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (W.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d
1100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
99. See Jameson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Pension Plan, 765 F.2d 49, 51 (3d Cir.
1985).
In Jameson, the Third Circuit found that applying state law to a pension claim was
constitutional. See id. at 52. According to this court, a cause of action arises under
federal law if it accrues after ERISA's effective date, even if ERISA standards are not
applicable. See id. Since the cause of action in Jameson accrued in 1980 when plaintiff's
request for benefits was denied, the court determined that it had subject matter jurisdic-
tion to hear the case. The court noted that it is not unusual for federal courts to apply
state law on occasion. See id.
The Eighth Circuit also found federal jurisdiction to decide pension claims based on
state law in Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1352 (8th Cir.
1980). The court determined that the interests of all the parties to that case would best be
served if state law governed the claim. It then decided the case according to state law
principles, as it found section 514(b)(1) "authorized and perhaps even required" it to do,
without ever directly addressing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
100. Jameson, 765 F.2d at 52; Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d
1496, 1507 (9th Cir. 1984) (Ferguson, 3., dissenting). Congress also intended that the
federal courts develop a body of federal common law that "supplements the statutory
scheme interstitially [and] ... serves to ramify and develop the standards that the statute
sets out in only general terms." Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1499. The Menhorn court
stressed, however, that like the Act, any federal common law created was only to be
applied prospectively. See id. at 1504.
101. Jameson, 765 F.2d at 52; Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1507 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) grants a plan participant access to the federal courts "to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B)
(1982).
102. Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1507-08 (Ferguson, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 71, at
934.
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grant to the federal system to hear state law claims in the absence of a
federal question or diversity of citizenship is of dubious validity, it should
be assumed that Congress intended to withhold such a grant.1"3 This
seems'to be the likely intent of Congress, since the federal interest in
hearing state pension claims is minimal when there is no federal law to
enforce or apply.'0 4 It also seems unlikely that Congress would want to
make a federal forum available to clarify rights that are derived from
state law;105 the remedy of clarification was intended to pertain to rights
created by ERISA. l° 6
Nor does the contention that a state court may have to apply ERISA
to part of a claim further the argument in favor of federal jurisdiction.
There is nothing objectionable about a state court applying ERISA.
Although a state law that attempts to regulate pension plans is invalid, a
state court may interpret and apply federal law."0 A distinction between
the regulation of benefit plans and the interpretation of federal employee
benefit law must be made. The former involves the creation of law in the
pension field, while the latter involves simply the interpretation of an
existing body of federal law.'08
CONCLUSION
Congress intended that the exception to ERISA's preemption provi-
sion be construed narrowly. However, the overly restrictive interpreta-
tion offered by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits has the effect of reading the
exception out of the Act entirely. By assuming that every claim denial
operates as both the accrual of the cause of action and a discretionary or
interpretive act or omission, this view causes ERISA standards to be ap-
plied in every case in which a claim denial occurred post-ERISA. The
broader view advocated by the Ninth Circuit considers each prong of the
exception separately, thereby ensuring that ERISA is not applied retro-
actively to pre-1975 acts or omissions that have resulted in post-1975
denials.
Federal courts should decline to hear the limited number of pension
benefits claims to which state law is determined to apply. Although the
preemption exception does not expressly restrict jurisdiction, it seems
103. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
104. See Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1503 (9th Cir.
1984).
105. See id
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1500 n.2; see also Jameson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Pension Plan, 765
F.2d 49, 52 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting, for example, that federal court will apply state claim
preclusion law in determining res judicata effect of state judgment on pending civil rights
case.)
108. See Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit
Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1313, 1330-31 (1984).
Such a distinction reconciles Congress' grant of concurrent jurisdiction in section 502
with the preemption provision. See id. at 1330.
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likely, given the constitutional issues implicated, that Congress did not
intend to grant the federal judiciary jurisdiction to hear state law pension
cases.
Rosemary Scariati

